We address the issue of optimal growth when standard-of-living aspirations are transmitted from one generation to the next. We derive the condition for the optimal solution to be stable in the saddle-point sense and show that this optimal solution may display damped oscillations even when the planner does not discount the utility of future generations golden rule case. The decentralization of the optimal solution aims at correcting the inter-generational externality by use of an investment subsidy and allows to avoid socially damaging rushes on consumption in expansion periods. It also allows to stabilize output in the case of competitive economies displaying endogenous uctuations. JEL Classi cation numbers: E32, O41.
Introduction
Many empirical studies show that according to past actions consumers' tastes change over time see e.g. Ferson and Constantinides, 1991 . Frameworks with habit formation involve preferences that are extended", according to Becker 1996's terminology, to account for the formation of personal and or social capital. In the personal capital case, each agent's own history in uences his current tastes and, hence, his decisions. Under the assumption of rational expectations, non-myopic agents forecast the change in their future preferences to compute the optimal decision see the discussion in Pashardes 1986 . In the social capital case, the history of the society or of the social group to which the agent belongs in uences his future tastes. This introduces a taste externality which is not taken into account in a decentralized world.
Both types of situations have been studied in the framemork of in nitely lived agents. On the one hand, Ryder and Heal 1973 analyse the personal capital case in a model a la Ramsey 1928 and show that the equilibrium can be characterized either by satiation or by the ful lling of the modi ed golden rule. Various authors have used similar present v alue models with personal habits to understand problems linked to consumption behaviour. On the other hand, Abel 1990 and Campbell and Cochrane 1995 use the assumption of social capital to understand the so-called equity premium puzzle.
If we adopt the framework of nitely lived agents, or overlapping generations, a third type of habit capital emerges naturally: this is the case in which preferences should be extended to allow for familial capital. Under this assumption, children become habituated to a certain standard-of-living whilst still with their parents. Their past standard-of-living serves as a benchmark to evaluate the level of their own current consumption, once they have become adults and work. Becker 1992 notices that the habits acquired as a child or young adult generally continue to in uence behavior even when the environment c hanges radically. For instance, Indian adults who migrate to the United States often eat the same type of cuisine they had in India, and continue to wear the same type of clothing.... Childhood-acquired habits then continue, even though these would not have developed if the environment when growing up had been the same as the environment faced as an adult." Using a parametric example, de la Croix 1996 shows that this assumption can be responsible for oscillatory dynamics and endogenous cycles in a competitive economy. The intuition is that the aspirations of the new generation are so high at some point o f a n expansion that savings are depressed to maintain consumption standards, which induces the beginning of a contraction. The contraction stops when aspirations have reverted to lower levels.
In this paper, we adress the issue of optimal growth in the presence of inherited tastes. When parents are sel sh, inherited tastes are responsible for an inter-generational externality and the inherited preferences are given to the children. Children carry along into adulhood the baggage of experiences they had only a limited role in shaping. Therefore a rational person can meaningfully state that she does not like her preferences in the sense that she doesn't like the inherited baggage: the guilt, the sexual fears, the propensity to smoke or to drink heavely, and so forth. " Becker, 1992 . This aspect may serve as a justi cation of making use of optimal solutions. After having derived the condition under which the competitive equilibrium with the taste externality displays uctuations and or explosive behaviour we look for the condition under which the optimal solution is stable in the saddle-point sense. One result will be that this optimal solution may display damped oscillations even when the planner does not discount the utility of future generations, i.e. in the golden rule case. Our result is surprising as the optimal solution is generally characterized by monotonous convergence in the one-sector overlapping generations model see e.g. Deckert 1984 . This is in fact true as long as the utility function is separable both across generations and across periods of life. If the utility function is non-separable across periods of life, Michel and Venditti 1996 show that the eigenvalues of the system are still real but that convergence is not ensured any longer, so that endogenous cycles could appear. When the utility is non-separable across generations, but still separable across periods of life for simplicity, we show that locally converging oscillatory dynamics are highly likely.
We then study the decentralization of the optimal path, and hence, the stabilization of the competitive economy, by means of investment subsidies and lump-sum transfers. One result is that investment subsidies should always bepositive, regardless of the sign of the e ect of interest rate on savings. The optimal policy is then illustrated by the means of an example. After having computed the trajectories of both the optimal and the competitive economy, w e w ant to compare the optimal policy for di erent v alues of the planner's discount rate. The question of the stabilization of the uctuations i.e. to what extent the uctuations of the competitive economy are reduced by the optimal policy is illustrated by our example.
The structure of the paper is as follows: the main assumptions of the model are presented in the rst section. Some implications of the competitive solutions are drawn in section 2. The optimal solution is analysed in section 3, its decentralization and an example of optimal policy are presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses some further questions that arise in the framework of bequeathed tastes and concludes.
The model
At each date, the economy is populated by three generations, each living for three periods. The growth rate of the population is zero. The young generation inherits standard-ofliving aspirations a t from their parents, following a t = c t,1 ; 8t 0 1 where c t,1 is the consumption level of the parents. The adult generation draws utility from consuming the quantity c t given its own aspiration level a t . When old, they will draw utility from consuming d t+1 and die. The inter-temporal utility of the typical adult is: uc t ; a t + vd t+1 We assume that bequeathed tastes determine a frame of reference against which consumption when adult is judged and that the depreciation rate of aspirations i.e. forgetting is high so that they no longer a ect the evaluation of consumption when old. 1 Moreover we assume u c ; v d 0 u a 0; u cc ; u aa ; v dd 0 and u ca 0: The assumption u ca 0 amounts postulating that a rise in aspirations increases the marginal utility of i.e. the desire for consumption. We also assume that
and that u is strictly concave:
At each date a single good is produced. This good can either be consumed by the middle-aged and old generation during the period or accumulated as capital for future production. Production occurs through a constant returns to scale technology. Output percapita y t is a function of capital intensity k t : y t = fk t in which f: is a neo-classical production function with f k 0; f kk 0. Assuming that capital depreciates entirely after one period, the resource constraint of the economy is:
At date 0 the economy is endowed with a given quantity of capital per capita k 0 and a level of aspirations a 0 .
The competitive economy
We do not provide a complete analysis of the competitive economy with bequeathed tastes in this section, but show that a competitive economy m a y exhibit limit cycles based on a di erent mechanism than those already pointed in the literature. In particular, we show that the presence of cycles requires neither a negative e ect of the interest rate on savings as it is the case in Grandmont 1985 nor low values of the elasticity o f substitution in production see Reichlin 1986 . Cycles result only from the fact that consumption is evaluated within a speci c context, that is, the standard-of-living when young.
The equilibrium
The competitive behaviour of rms lead to the equalization of marginal productivities to marginal costs:
where R t is the interest factor paid on loans and w t is the wage rate paid to workers. The adult generation sells one unit of labour inelastically at any real wage w t , consumes the quantity c t and saves s t for next period consumption by holding capital:
The old generation spends all its savings plus interest accrued and consumes d t+1 :
The maximisation programme of the individual is thus to choose fc t ; d t+1 g in order to Since the utility function is concave and there is no wage income in the last period of life, savings increase with wage income. The e ect of rising aspirations is to reduce savings, because it increases the desire for consumption when adult. The e ect of the interest rate on savings is ambiguous and depends, as usual, on the value of the intertemporal elasticity o f substitution, v dd d t+1 =v d .
The equilibrium condition on the capital market implies k t+1 = s t 9
Combining 1, 3, 4, 8 and 9, the competitive equilibrium is de ned as a sequence fk t ; a t ; t 0g which satis es: Assuming that a positive steady state exists, we can show that a Naimark-Sacker 2 bifurcation arises when the taste externality is strong enough. The Naimark-Sacker theorem is a powerful tool for the detection of limit cycles in discrete maps. Indeed a limit cycle appears either on the low or on the high side of the critical parameter value in a neighbourhood of the bifurcation point. there is a Naimark-Sacker bifurcation in the parameter . The proof of this is given in Appendix A.
The conditions under which a Naimark-Sacker bifurcation arises are not too restrictive: the su cient condition 12 assumes that the e ect of the interest rate on savings is not too" negative. In condition 13 which is derived from the fact that the trace of the Jacobian of the linearized system should be lower than 2, the term in brackets is positive if the corresponding Diamond model is stable.
These conditions are satis ed in the simple example provided by de la Croix 1996:
taking a Cobb-Douglas production function y t = k t and a utility of the form lnc t , a t + ln d t+1 , the Naimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs when = 1 + , q 1 + 2 , 4 = + 1 2 = + 1 which is always between 0 and 1.
It is theoretically possible to check whether the limit cycle that is implied by the Naimark-Sacker bifurcation theorem appears on the unstable side of the xed point and is attracting or whether it encircles the xed point on the stable side and is thus repelling. However, the computations involved are very lengthy see Hale and Ko cak, 1991 and the expressions depend on third derivatives of utility and production functions. As Farmer 1986 stresses, since economic theory does not place a priori restrictions on third derivatives, one can expect either repelling or attracting cycles to exist.
The spill-over from one generation to the next has two components: a the savings of the old generation nance the capital stock required for production as well as the wages of the adult generation; this process transforming income savings of the old into income for the adult displays decreasing returns; b past consumption levels of the parents generate standard-of-living aspirations for the young generation, inducing them to spend more on consumption; this process displays constant returns. The interpretation of the existence of cycles in the competitive economy is the following: due to the decreasing returns in the production process, the bequest in terms of higher wages will not su cient to cover the bequest in terms of higher aspirations at some point in time. This leads to a drop in savings to maintain the standard-of-living and thus induces a recession. When the consecutive impoverishment is strong enough, aspirations have reverted to lower levels, allowing a rise in savings and the start of an expansion period. Depending on the relative strength of the two e ects, this process can either converge, explode or lead to everlasting cycles. current and future generations. Assuming that the central planner's discount factor is , the social welfare function takes the following form: 
The rst equation is a condition for the optimal allocation of consumption between the adult and the old generation which are alive at the same time. The marginal utility of consumption of adults corrected to internalize the taste externality is equalized to the marginal utility of consumption of the old. Note that, due to the presence of the taste externality and contrary to the standard Diamond 1965 model, this planner's rst-order condition does not respect the rst-order condition the individual chooses for himself in a market economy equation 7. The second equation is the usual condition describing the optimal intertemporal allocation.
The steady state fc; a; k; dg of this optimal economy is de ned by: states that the negative e ect of habits does not o set the gain in welfare linked to a rise in consumption, when c = 0. In particular, the existence of the steady state is guaranteed as long as the world is not Veblenian: Veblen believed that the welfare of a typical person primarily depends on his relative income position. In that case, the value of a social capital causing envy exactly o sets the value of own consumption. A rise in all incomes in a community b y the same percentage would not improve a n yone's welfare in Veblen's world see Becker 1974 , Veblen 1934 . Notice that given the concavity o f uc; a, for = 1 condition 21 is always satis ed. In the other cases, 21 imposes a restriction on u ca conditionally on , u cc and u aa : u ca ju cc j + jU aa j 1 + This condition is satis ed for every 's as long as u ca j u cc j and u ca j u aa j. If not, there is a restriction on .
Turning our attention to the dynamics of the optimal economy, we see that it can be described by the following system of four rst-order non-linear di erence equations: in which a t and k t are predetermined and c t+1 and d t+1 are anticipated variables. For the equilibrium de ned by 22 to be unique and locally converging to the steady state, since there are two anticipated variables in the system two and only two eigenvalues of its linearization should have a modulus larger than one. The condition 0 is always satis ed if e.g. u ca = 0 , which corresponds to the case in which inherited tastes do not a ect the marginal utility of consumption when adult. We thus retrieve the standard result of optimal growth. More surprisingly, the condition 0 is satis ed if v dd or f kk is close enough to zero, i.e. if v: and f: are not too concave. Notice also that, even when = 1, i.e. the planner does not discount the future at all, the condition 0 is not necessarily satis ed. This implies that the optimal dynamics around the golden rule can be characterised by oscillations.
4 Decentralizing the rst best solution
Optimal taxation
The decentralization of the rst best solution aims at two objectives: a to adjust the adults' consumption of in order to internalize the externality; b to adjust savings to match the level of the modi ed golden rule. This decentralization can beachieved by means of an investment subsidy i t 1 and by using lump sum transfers to the adults, g t , and to the old, p t . An alternative w ould be to tax the consumption of the adult generation and that of the old di erently, but such a discrimination does not seem fortunate.
The in which starred variables denote the optimal levels. Using 14, it is clear that this expression is always positive, whatever the e ect of interest rates on savings.2
Comparing the competitive equilibrium to the optimal solution described in 22, it appears that the two remaining instruments should follow: 
Example
It is interesting to illustrate these results by an example. We shall compute the optimal trajectories of the optimal economy for two di erent planner's discount rates and compare them to the trajectory of the competitive economy. We also provide the dynamic path of optimal taxes and subsidies. The intertemporal utility of the consumer is given by:
The production function is given by y t = k t . Taking = :43, = :25, = 10 and = :65, the steady state output of the optimal economy is 13.527 when = :99 and 10.772 when = :5. Steady state output of the economy with perfect competition is 9.927. The eigenvalues of the linearized systems are presented in table 1. We see that the unique optimal trajectory locally converging to the steady state displays damped oscillations, even when = :99. This illustrates the fact that a high planner's discount factor does not prevent the optimal economy from displaying uctuations.
Starting with a negligible initial capital stock and low aspirations, the equilibrium of the optimal economy and of the competitive economy are presented in gures 1 and 2 for two di erent values of . The simulations are performed using the methodology proposed by Boucekkine 1995 for saddle-point trajectories. The in nite horizon problem is approximated by a horizon of 100 periods. Increasing the simulation horizon further does not modify the results. Only the rst 14 periods are displayed since the steady state is almost attained after 14 periods.
Considering rst the competitive economy dashed lines, identical in the two gures, aspirations at rst increase rapidly. After three periods of growth the adults start saving less in order to maintain a sustained increase in consumption. The capital stock starts declining at t = 3 as aspirations increase faster than wages, the latter being subject to decreasing marginal returns. After period 3, wages and interest revenues start to decrease in line with the capital stock, which depresses consumption of both adult and old agents. When aspirations have reverted to su ciently low levels at t = 6 the capital stock starts increasing again and the economy converges to its steady state with damped oscillations.
It is clear from gure 1 that, at steady state, capital, aspirations and consumption are higher in the optimal economy of the quasi golden rule type = :99 than in the competitive economy. To obtain this allocation, the optimal policy consists of subsidizing savings in order to initially lower the rise in consumption and hence avoid the rush on it by the adult generations. These subsidies are nanced by lump-sum taxes bearing essentially on the old agents, implying that what is given by one hand in a proportional way is taken by the other in a lump-sum fashion. Notice nally that, in the growth process, the utility of the generations born in t + 2 and t + 3 is higher in the competitive economy, but is at the expense of all future generations.
The comparison of gure 2 with gure 1 shows that investment subsidies are lower when = :5 than in the case = :99. Moreover, in the quasi golden rule case, the transferts from the olds to the adults are higher. Indeed, these transferts are useful to increase the capital stock which bene ts to all future generations.
Conclusion
We h a ve studied a model in which utility is non-separable across generations and familial capital in terms of tastes is transmitted from one generation to another. This framemork introduces an externality that is not taken into account b y non-altruistic parents and may beresponsible for endogenous uctuations in competitive economies.
We h a ve adressed the issue of optimal growth in this case. Having studied the dynamic system corresponding to the optimal growth problem, we show that the solution is always stable in the saddle-point sense provided that the world is non-Veblenian, i.e. that the welfare of a typical agent does not only depend on its relative position. We also show that this optimal solution may display oscillations even when the planner does not discount the utility of future generations, that is, in the golden rule case.
The decentralization of the optimal solution aims at correcting the inter-generational externality and can beachieved with three instruments. A su cient policy is indeed to subsidize savings in order to avoid socially unsustainable rushes on consumption by the adult generations. The decentralization also allows to stabilize the economy, therefore avoiding endogenous uctuations.
An interesting extension would be to consider altruistic agents. In that case, even if the non-zero bequest condition is binding, altruism has an in uence on the economy: parents could restrain themselves to make their children less demanding and hence increase their welfare.
Finally, keeping in mind that the presence of positive externalities is at the root of endogenous growth models, the introduction of bequeathed tastes adds a negative externality to the model. Another interesting extension could then beto investigate the conditions under which one type of externality dominates the other, making unbounded growth optimal or not. one root x i such that 0 x i 1. We thus have two real stable roots, x 1 and x 2 , and hence two real unstable roots 1 x 1 and 1 x 2 ensuring a monotonous local convergence.
If 0, 1 and 2 are complex conjugates with modulus j i j 2 = P. 1 = x 1 + 1 x 1 is non-real. We also have that 
